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Time-varying constrained proximal type dynamics
in multi-agent network games
Carlo Cenedese Giuseppe Belgioioso Sergio Grammatico Ming Cao
Abstract—In this paper, we study multi-agent network games
subject to affine time-varying coupling constraints and a time-
varying communication network. We focus on the class of
games adopting proximal dynamics and study their convergence
to a persistent equilibrium. The assumptions considered to
solve the problem are discussed and motivated. We develop
an iterative equilibrium seeking algorithm, using only local
information, that converges to a special class of game equilibria.
Its derivation is motivated by several examples, showing that the
original game dynamics fail to converge. Finally, we apply the
designed algorithm to solve a constrained consensus problem,
validating the theoretical results.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation: Multi-agent decision making over networks
In multi-agent decision making over networks, all the
decision makers, in short, agents, share their information
only with a selected number of agents. In particular, the
agents’ state (or decision) is the result of a local decision
making process, e.g. a constrained optimization problem, and
a distributed communication with the neighboring agents,
defined by the communication network. In many problems,
the goal of the agents is reaching a collective equilibrium
state, where no agent can benefit from changing its state. The
local interation between the agents is exploited in opinion
dynamics to model the evolution of a population’s collective
opinion as an emerging phenomenon of the local interac-
tions, see [1], [2], [3]. Another interesting consequence of
the communication structure is that the agents keep their
own data private, exchanging information only with selected
agents. This characteristic is of particular interest in, for
example, traffic and information networks problems [4] or
in the charging scheduling of electric vehicles [5], [6]. This
class of problems arises also in other applications, e.g., in
smart grids [7], [8] and sensor network [9], [10].
B. Literature overview: Multi-agent optimization and multi-
agent network games
In this work, we study a particular instance of the prob-
lem introduced above, namely a multi-agent network game,
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where the communication network and the constraints be-
tween the agents are both time-varying. Multi-agent network
games arise from the well established field of distributed
optimization and equilibrium seeking over networks. In the
past years, several results were proposed for optimization
problems subject to a time-varying communication network:
in [11] the subgradients of the cost functions are bounded
and the communication is described by a strongly connected
sequence of directed graphs, while in [12] the cost functions
are assumed to be continuously differentiable and a linearly
convergent algorithm is designed under the assumption of
a time-varying undirected communication network. Another
approach, explored in [13], is to construct a game, whose
emerging behavior solves the optimization problems. In this
case, the cost functions are differentiable and the communi-
cation ruled by an undirected time-varying graph connected
over time.
The problem of noncooperative multi-agent games, subject
to coupling constrains, was firstly studied in [14], under the
assummptions of continuosly differentiable cost functions
and no network structure between the agents. In the past
years, several researchers focused on this class of problems
providing many results for games over networks, e.g., in [15],
[16], [5] where the communication network is always as-
sumed undirected, while the cost functions are chosen either
differentiable or continuously differentiable. Moreover, some
authors also focused on the class of noncooperative games
over time-varying communication network, in particular on
the unconstrained case. For example, in [17] differentiable
and strictly convex cost functions with Lipschitz continuous
gradient were considered, where the sequence of time-
varying communication networks was repeatedly strongly
connected, and the associated adjacency matrices doubly
stochastic.
C. Paper contribution
A complete formulation of multi-agent network games,
subject to proximal type dynamics, can be found in [8] where
the unconstrained case is studied for a time-varying strongly
connected communication network, described by a doubly
stochastic adjacency matrix. In [18], [19], the condition on
the double stochasticity of the adjacency matrix was relaxed,
in the first case by means of a dwell time. Notice that these
types of games can also be rephrased as paracontracions; in
this framework, the work in [20] provided convergence for
repeatedly jointly connected digraphs. Iterative equilibrium
seeking algorithms were developed for constrained multi-
agent network games in [8], [19] under the assumption of
a static communication network.
In this work, we aim to address the problem of a con-
strained multi-agent network games subject to a time-varying
communication network. In particular, we first discuss the
convergence of the game and motivate the technical as-
sumption needed to ensure the existence of an equilibrium,
and then we develop an equilibrium seeking algorithm that
achieves global convergence for the game at hand. The
main difference with the work in [19] is the presence of
both time-varying communication network and time-varying
constraints, and this generalization leads to several technical
challenges, requiring a more involved convergence analysis.
II. NOTATION
A. Basic notation
The set of real, positive, and non-negative numbers are
denoted by R, R>0 and R≥0, respectively; R := R ∪ {∞}.
The set of natural numbers is denoted by N. For a square
matrix A ∈ Rn×n, its transpose is denoted by A⊤, [A]i
denotes the i-th row of the matrix, and [A]ij the element in
the i-th row and j-th column.Also, A ≻ 0 (A  0) stands
for a symmetric and positive definite (semidefinite) matrix,
while > (≥) describes an element wise inequality. A⊗B is
the Kronecker product of the matrices A and B. The identity
matrix is denoted by In ∈ Rn×n, and 0 (1) represents the
vector/matrix with only 0 (1) elements. For x1, . . . , xN ∈
R
n and N = {1, . . . , N}, the collective vector is denoted
as x := col((xi)i∈N ) = [x
⊤
1 , . . . , x
⊤
N ]
⊤ and x−i :=
col((xj)j∈N\{i}) = [x
⊤
1 , . . . , x
⊤
i−1, x
⊤
i+1, . . . , x
⊤
N ]
⊤. Given
the N operators A1, . . . , AN , diag(A1, . . . , AN ) denotes
a block-diagonal operators with A1, . . . , AN as diagonal
elements. The Cartesian product of the sets Ω1, . . . ,ΩN is
described by
∏N
i=1Ωi. Given two vectors x, y ∈ R
n and a
symmetric and positive definite matrix Q ≻ 0, the weighted
inner product and norm are denoted by 〈x | y 〉Q and ‖x‖Q,
respectively; the Q−induced matrix norm is denoted by
‖A‖Q. A real n dimensional Hilbert space obtained by
endowing H = (Rn, ‖ · ‖) with the product 〈x | y 〉Q is
denoted by HQ.
B. Operator-theoretic notations and definitions
The identity operator is defined by Id(·). The indicator
function ιC : R
n → [0,+∞] of C ⊆ Rn is defined as
ιC(x) = 0 if x ∈ C; +∞ otherwise. The set valued mapping
NC : R
n
⇒ R
n stands for the normal cone to the set
C ⊆ Rn, that is NC(x) = {u ∈ Rn | sup〈C − x, u〉 ≤ 0} if
x ∈ C and ∅ otherwise. The graph of a set valued mapping
A : X ⇒ Y is gra(A) := {(x, u) ∈ X × Y |u ∈ A(x)}.
For a function φ : Rn → R, define dom(φ) := {x ∈
R
n|f(x) < +∞} and its subdifferential set-valued mapping,
∂φ : dom(φ) ⇒ Rn, ∂φ(x) := {u ∈ Rn| 〈y − x|u〉 +
φ(x) ≤ φ(y) , ∀y ∈ dom(φ)}. The projection operator
over a closed set S ⊆ Rn is projS(x) : R
n → S and
it is defined as projS(x) := argminy∈S‖y − x‖
2. The
proximal operator proxf (x) : R
n → dom(f) is defined by
proxf (x) := argminy∈Rnf(y) +
1
2‖x − y‖
2. A set valued
mapping F : Rn ⇒ Rn is ℓ-Lipschitz continuous with ℓ > 0,
if ‖u − v‖ ≤ ℓ‖x − y‖ for all (x, u) , (y, v) ∈ gra(F);
F is (strictly) monotone if for all (x, u), (y, v) ∈ gra(F)
〈u−v, x−y〉 ≥ (>)0 holds, and maximally monotone if there
is no monotone operator with a graph that strictly contains
gra(F); F is α-strongly monotone if for all (x, u), (y, v) ∈
gra(F) it holds 〈x−y, u−v〉 ≥ α‖x−y‖2. JF := (Id+F)−1
denotes the resolvent mapping of F . Let fix(A) := {x ∈
R
n|x ∈ F(x)} and zer(F) := {x ∈ Rn| 0 ∈ F(x)}
denote the set of fixed points and zeros of F , respectively.
The operator A : Rn → Rn is η-averaged (η-AVG) in
HQ, with η ∈ (0, 1), if ‖A(x) − A(y)‖2Q ≤ ‖x − y‖
2
Q −
1−η
η ‖(Id − A)(x) − (Id − A)(y)‖
2
Q, for all x, y ∈ R
n; A
is nonexpansive (NE) if 1-AVG; A is firmly nonexpansive
(FNE) if 12 -AVG; A is β-cocoercive if βA is
1
2 -AVG (i.e.,
FNE). The operator A belongs to the class I in HP if and
only if dom(A) = Rn and for all y ∈ fix(A) and x ∈ Rn
it holds ‖x − Ax‖P ≤ 〈x − Ax, x − y〉P . Several type of
operators belongs to this class, e.g. FNE operators and the
resolvent of a maximally monotone operator. We refer to [21]
for more properties of operators of class I.
III. MATHEMATICAL SETUP AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
A. Mathematical formulation
We consider N players (or agents) taking part in a game.
A constrained network game is defined by three main com-
ponents: the constraints each players has to satisfy, the cost
functions to be minimized and the communication network.
The constraints can be divided in two types: local and
coupling. At every time instant k ∈ N, each agent i ∈ N :=
{1, . . . , N} adopts an action (or strategy) xi ∈ R
n belonging
to its local feasible set Ωi ⊂ Rn, i.e., the collection of those
strategies meeting its local constraints. We assume that this
set is convex and closed.
Standing Assumption 1 (Convexity): For every i ∈ N , the
set Ωi ⊂ Rn is non-empty, compact and convex.
The agents are also subject to M time-varying affine and
separable coupling constraints, that generate an entanglement
between the strategy chosen by player i and those of the
others. For an agent i ∈ N , at time instant k ∈ N, the time-
varying set of strategies satisfying the coupling constraints,
given the other agents’ strategies x−i, reads as
Xi(x−i, k) :=
{
y ∈ Rn |Ci(k)y +
∑N
j=1
j 6=i
Cj(k)xj(k) ≤ c(k)
}
where Cj(k) ∈ RM×n and c(k) ∈ RM .
In the following, we refer to the collective vector x :=
col((xi)i∈N ) ∈ RNn as the strategy profile of the game. All
the strategies profiles that satisfy both the local and coupling
constraints determine the collective feasible decision set,
defined as
X (k) := Ω ∩
{
x ∈ RNn|C(k)x ≤ c(k)
}
(1)
where C(k) := [C1(k), . . . , CN (k)] ∈ RM×Nn and Ω :=∏N
i=1 Ωi.
Standing Assumption 2: For all i ∈ N and k ∈ N,
the collective feasible decision set X (k) satisfies Slater’s
condition.
All the players in the network are assumed myopic and
rational, and thus each agent i ∈ N aims only at minimizing
its local cost function Ji(xi, z). The myopic nature of the
agents is reflected in the argument of the cost function that
depend only on the current strategies of the players (as we
will clarify in the following). In this work, we assume that
the cost function have the proximal structure, as defined next.
Standing Assumption 3 (Proximal cost functions): For all
i ∈ N , the function Ji : Rn × Rn → R is defined as
Ji(xi, z) := f¯i(xi) +
1
2‖xi − z‖
2, (2)
where the function f¯i := fi + ιΩi : R
n → R is convex and
lower semi-continuous.
The cost function is composed of two parts, f¯i is the local
part and has a double role: describing the local objective of
agent i, via fi, and ensuring that the next strategy belongs to
Ωi, through the indicator function ιΩi . The quadratic part of
Ji works as a regularization term and penalizes the distance
of the local strategy from z. It is also responsible for the
strict-convexity of Ji, even though f¯i is only lower semi-
continuous, see [22, Th. 27.23].
Before providing a formal description of the second ar-
gument z in the cost function, let us introduce the time-
varying communication network adopted by the agents. We
assume that, at each time instant k ∈ N, it is described by a
strongly connected digraph, defined via the couple (V , A(k)).
The set V represents the nodes of the graph that are the
players in the game, i.e., V = N , so this set does not vary
over time. The matrix A(k) denotes the adjacency matrix
of the digraph, at time k, where ai,j(k) := [A(k)]ij . For
every i, j ∈ N , ai,j(k) ∈ [0, 1] is the weight that agent i
assigns to the strategy of agent j. If ai,j(k) = 0, then agent
i does not communicate with agent j. The set of all the
neighbors of agent i is defined as Ni(k) := {j | ai,j(k) > 0}.
The following assumption formalizes the properties of the
adjacency matrix required throughout this work.
Standing Assumption 4 (Row stochasticity and self-loops):
At every time instant k ∈ N, the communication graph
is strongly connected. The matrix A(k) = [ai,j(k)]
is row stochastic, i.e., ai,j(k) ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ N ,
and
∑N
j=1 ai,j(k) = 1, for all i ∈ N . Moreover,
A(k) has strictly-positive diagonal elements, i.e.,
mini∈N ai,i(k) =: ak > 0 .
For each agent i ∈ N , the term z in (2) represents an
aggregative quantity defined by
z :=
∑N
j=1ai,j(k)xj(k) ,
and hence it is the average of the neighbors’ strategies,
weighted via the adjacency matrix A(k). So, the actual cost
function of agent i at time k is Ji(xi,
∑N
j=1 ai,j(k)xj(k)).
As mentioned before, the agents are considered rational,
thus their only objective is to minimize their local cost
function, while satisfying the local and coupling constraints.
The dynamics describing this behavior are the myopic best
response dynamics, defined, for each player i ∈ N , as:
xi(k + 1) = argmin
y∈Xi(x−i,k)
Ji
(
y,
∑N
j=1 ai,j(k)xj(k)
)
. (3)
The interaction of the N players, using dynamics (3), can be
natuarally formalized as a noncooperative network game,
defined, for all k ∈ N, as
∀i ∈ N :


argmin
y∈Rn
fi(y) +
1
2
∥∥∥y −∑Nj=1 ai,jxj
∥∥∥2
s.t. y ∈ Ωi ∩ Xi(x−i, k) ,
(4)
where we omitted the time dependency of ai,j(k) and xj(k)
to ease the notation.
B. Equilibrium concept and convergence
For the game in (4), the concept of equilibrium point is non
trivial. A popular equilibrium notion for constrained game
is the, so called, generalized network equilibrium (GNWE).
Loosely speaking, a profile strategy xˆ is a GNWE of the
game, if no player i can change its strategy to another
feasible one while decreasing Ji
(
xˆi,
∑N
j=1 ai,j xˆj
)
. Notice
that, if A does not have self-loops, GNWE boils down to
generalized Nash equilibrium, see [14].
This idea of equilibrium cannot be directly applied to (4)
and in fact every variation in the communication network
generates a different game, with its own set of GNWE.
Therefore, the equilibria in which we are interested are those
invariant to the changes in the communication; they take the
name of persistent GNWE (p–GNWE).
Definition 1 (persistent GNWE): A collective vector x¯ =
col((x¯i)i∈N ) is a persistent GNWE (p–GNWE) for the game
(4), if there exists some k > 0, such that for all i ∈ N ,
x¯i =
⋂
k≥k¯
argmin
y∈X (x¯−i,k)
Ji
(
y,
∑N
j=1 ai,j(k)x¯j
)
. (5)
We have defined both the game and the set of equilibria
we are interested in. Let us now elaborate on the convergence
properties of the game in (4), providing three examples
highlighting different aspects of these dynamics. By means
of the first two examples, we show, first that the dynamics in
(3) can fail to converge to an equilibrium point, even in the
case of a static communication network, where the existence
of a GNWE is guaranteed by [8, Prop. 4] and then that the
existence of p–GNWE is not guaranteed. Finally, the last
example shows a case where the game in (4) converges.
Example 1 (non–convergence): Consider a 2-player con-
strained game, where, for i ∈ {1, 2}, xi ∈ R and the
local feasible decision set is defined as Xi(u) := {v ∈
R |u + v = 0} = {−u} and does not vary over time.
The collective feasible decision set is convex and reads as
X := {x ∈ R2 |x1 + x2 = 0}, hence the game is jointly
convex. The dynamics of the game are as in (3), and can be
rewritten in closed form as the discrete-time linear system:
[
x1(k + 1)
x2(k + 1)
]
=
[
0 −1
−1 0
] [
x1(k)
x2(k)
]
, (6)
which is not globally convergent, e.g., consider x1(0) =
x2(0) = 1.
Example 2 (equilibirum existence): Consider a 2-player
game without local or coupling constraints and scalar strate-
gies. The communication network can vary between the
two graphs described respectively by the adjacency matrices
A1 =
[
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
]
and A2 =
[
1/3 2/3
1/3 2/3
]
. The cost functions of
the agents are in the form of (2), where the local part is
chosen as f¯i(xi) =
1
2‖xi − i‖
2, for i ∈ {1, 2}. For each
one of the communication networks, there exists only one
equilibrium point of the game, i.e., xA1 = [5/4 , 7/4]
⊤ and
xA2 = [4/3 , 11/6]
⊤, when respectively A1 or A2 is adopted.
Therefore the set of p–GNWE of the game is empty, leading
the dynamics to oscillate between xA1 and xA2 .
Example 3 (convergence): Once again, consider the a 2-
player game, where for a player i ∈ {1, 2} the local feasible
set is Ωi = [−1, 1] and fi(xi) = 0. The collective feasible
decision set is defined as
X (k) := {x ∈ [−1, 1]2 |m(k) ≤ x1 + x2}
where m(k) ∈ [−1,−0.25]. We choose A(k) satisfying
Standing Assumption 4 and it is doubly stochastic, for every
time instant k ∈ N. If the strategy profile belongs to the
consensus subspace C, both agents achieve the minimum
of their cost function, and therefore all those points are
equilibria of the unconstrained game. Furthermore, for the
set Cˆ = {u ∈ R2 |u = α1⊤, α ∈ [−0.25, 1]}, it always
holds that Cˆ ⊆ C ∩ X , and hence they are p-GNWE of
the game. Assume that at k¯ > 0, m(k¯) = −0.25, then, for
all k > k¯, the dynamics reduce to x(k + 1) = A(k)x(k),
therefore the profile strategy will converge to a point in Cˆ,
i.e., to a p–GNWE of the game.
C. Primal–dual characterization
As illustrated in Example 1, the myopic constrained dy-
namics in (3) can fail to converge, and thus we recast them
as pseudo collaborative ones. The idea is that each player
will minimize its own cost function, while at the same time
coordinate with the others to satisfy the constraints. With this
approach, we aim to achieve asymptotic fulfillment of the
coupling constraints. As a first step, we dualize the dynamics
introducing, for each player i ∈ N , a dual variable λi ∈ RM≥0.
The arising problem is an auxiliary (extended) network game,
see [23, Ch. 3]. The collective vector of the dual variables is
denoted by λ := col((λi)i∈N ). The equilibrium concept is
adapted to this modification in the dynamics, so we define
the persistent Extended Network Equilibrium (p–ENWE).
Definition 2 (persistent Extended Network Equilibrium):
The pair (x,λ), is a p–ENWE for the game in (4) if there
exists k¯ > 0 such that, for every i ∈ N ,
xi =
⋂
k≥k¯
argmin
y∈Rn
Ji
(
y,
∑N
j=1 ai,j(k)xj
)
+ λ
⊤
i Ci(k)y,
λi =
⋂
k≥k¯
argmin
ξ∈RM
≥0
−ξ⊤(C(k)x− c(k)) . (7)
In the following, we assume the presence of a central
coordinator facilitating the synchronization between agents.
This approach aligns with the new pseudo-collaborative
behaviors of the agents, which is widely used in the literature.
The central coordinator broadcasts an auxiliary variable σ ∈
R
M to each agent i, that, in turn, uses this information to
compute its local dual variable λi. Specifically, at every time
instant k, the agent scales the received variable σ(k), by a
possibly time-varying factor αi(k) ∈ [0, 1], attaining in this
way its local dual variable, i.e., λi(k) := αi(k)σ(k). The
scaling factors αi describe how the burden of satisfying the
constraints are divided between the agents, hence
∑N
i=1 αi =
1. If αi = 1/N, for all i ∈ N , then the effort to satisfy the
couplying constraints is fairly splitted between the agents,
this case is considered in several works, e.g., [5], [15], [24].
This class of problems was introduced for the first time in the
seminal work by Rosen [25], where the author formulates the
concept of normalized equilibrium. We adapt this idea for the
problem at hand, defining the persistent normalized extended
network equilibrium (pn-ENWE).
Definition 3 (persistent normalized-ENWE): The pair
(x, σ), is a pn–ENWE for the game in (4), if it exists k¯ > 0,
such that for all i ∈ N it satisfies
xi =
⋂
k≥k¯
argmin
y∈Rn
Ji
(
y,
∑N
j=1 ai,j(k)xj
)
+ αi(k)σ
⊤Ci(k)y,
σ =
⋂
k≥k¯
argmin
ς∈RM
≥0
−ς⊤(C(k)x− c(k)), (8)
with αi(k) > 0.
The following lemma shows that a pn–ENWE is also a p–
GNWE, and vice versa.
Lemma 1 (p–GNWE as fixed point): The following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) x is a p–GNWE for the game in (4);
(ii) ∃σ ∈ RM and k¯ > 0 such that col(x, σ) ∈ E , where E
is the set of all the pn–GNWE of the game (4).
We omit the demonstration of the lemma, since it is analo-
gous to that in [8, Lem. 2].
This reformulation of the problem addresses the criticism
highlighted in Example 2. In the following, we develop a
distributed iterative algorithm converging to a p-GNWE of
the original game in (4).
D. On the existence of persistent equilibria
We devote the remainder of the section to a more in depth
analysis of the problem of the existence of a p–GNWE for
the game in (4). In general, there is no guarantee that such
an equilibrium exists, as shown in Example 2. The literature
∀i ∈ N : x˜i = prox δi(k)
δi(k)+1
f¯i
(
δi(k)
δi(k)+1
(
1
δi(k)
xi +
∑N
j=1ai,j(k)xj − αi(k)C
⊤
i (k)σ
))
(9a)
σ˜ = proj
RM
≥0
(
σ + 1β(k) (C(k)x− c(k))
)
(9b)
∀i ∈ N : x+i = xi + γ(k)qi(k)
[
δi(k)(x˜i − xi) +
∑N
j=1ai,j(k)(x˜j − xj)− αi(k)C
⊤
i (k) (σ˜ − σ)
]
(9c)
σ+ = σ + γ(k)
[
β(k)(σ˜ − σ) + C(k)(x˜− x)
]
(9d)
dealing similar problems is split on how to handle this
problem. Namely, two possible assumptions can be adopted
to proceed with the analysis. The first one supposes a priori
the existence of at least one p–GNWE in the game. This
assumption does not restrict the problem at hand, since the
convergence can be established only for the cases in which
it is satisfied. However, it can be difficult to check if this
assumption holds in practice. This approach is the one chosen
in this work and it is usually adopted when the focus is more
on theoretical results, see [22, Cor. 5.19], [26, Prop. 3.1], [8,
Ass. 3] and [19, Ass. 6].
Standing Assumption 5 (Existence of a pn-ENWE): The
set of pn-ENWE of (4) is non-empty, hence E 6= ∅ .
On the other hand, the second assumption considers only
those games in which the N local cost functions share at
least one common fixed point. This implies that at least one
point in the consensus subspace is an equilibrium invariant
to the change of the communication network. If, at the same
time, this point is also feasible, then it is a p–GNWE of the
game. This assumption is clearly stronger than the previous
one. Nevertheless, it is easier to verify in practice, since it
only requires the analysis of the cost functions of the agents,
as shown in Example 3. Mainly for this reason, it is widely
spread throughout the literature, where it is either implicitly
verified as in [27] or explicitly required [20, Ass in Th. 2] .
IV. CONVERGENCE RESULT
Next, we propose the main result of this paper, an iterative
and decentralized algorithm converging to a pn-GNWE of the
game in (4). We call it TV–Prox–GNWE and it is reported in
(9a)–(9d), while its complete derivation is described in the
Appendix.
In order to provide the bounds for the choices of the
parameters in the algorithm, let us redefine the matrix A(k)
via a diagonal matrix, an upper and a lower triangular matrix,
i.e., A(k) = Aut(k) +Ad(k) +Alt(k), where Aut and Alt
always have zeros diagonal elements. For each time instant
k ∈ N, the parameters in TV–Prox–GNWE are set such that,
the following inequalities hold:
min
i∈N
(δ−1i + ai,i) ≥ ‖A−Ad‖+ ‖C
⊤ −ΛC⊤‖ (10a)
max
i∈N
(2qi(δ
−1
i + ai,i)) < R+ γ
−1 (10b)
R := 2‖QAut +AQlt‖+ ‖Q(C
⊤ −ΛC⊤)‖
β ≥ 12‖C −CΛ‖ (10c)
β < 12
(
γ−1 − ‖C −CΛ‖
)
(10d)
where Λ(k) := diag((αi(k))i∈N ) ⊗ In and Q(k) :=
diag((qi(k))i∈N ) ⊗ In, with qi being the i-th element of
the left Perron-Frobenius eigenvector of A(k). Also in this
case, we omitted the time dependency of the matrices to ease
the notation. The bounds in (10c) – (10d) implicitly lead to a
condition on the maximum value of the step size γ, namely
γ ≤ 1
2
‖C −CΛ‖−1.
The TV–Prox–GNWE in (9), is composed of three main
steps: a proximal gradient descend, performed by every agent
(9a), a dual ascend done by the central coordinator (9b) and
correction step, in (9c) – (9d), to balance the asymmetricity
of the weights in the directed network, i.e., ai,j 6= aj,i.
The main technical result of the paper is the following
theorem, where we establish global convergence of the
sequence generated by the TV–Prox–GNWE to a p-GNWE
of the game in (4).
Theorem 1: For all i ∈ N and k ∈ N, set αi(k) = qi(k),
with qi(k) the i-th element of the left Perron–Frobenius
eigenvector of A(k), and choose δi(k), β(k) and γ satisfying
(10). Then, for any initial condition, the sequence (x(k))k∈N
generated by (9) converges to a p-GNWE of the game in
(4).
Proof: See Appendix.
V. SIMULATION
In this section, we adopt TV–Prox–GNWE to solve a
problem of constrained consensus. We consider a game
with N = 15 agents, where the strategy of every agent
i is xi ∈ R5, and its local feasible decision set is Ωi ∈
[mi, Mi], withmi andMi randomly drawn respectively from
[−100,−5] and [5, 100]. The local cost function is equal
to fi(xi) = ιΩi (xi). The adjacency matrices, descibing the
communication network at every time instant k, are randomly
generated and define digraphs of the type small-word, satis-
fying Standing Assumption 4. The coupling constraints are
used to force the strategies towards the consensus subspace
and are in the form |xi(k) − xj(k)| ≤ s(k)1, for every
i, j ∈ N , where s(k) > 0 and it is decreasing over time.
Notice that in this case the multiplier graph is complete, see
[15]. Finally, the parameters of the algorithm are chosen such
that they always satisfy (10).
The trajectory of the profile strategy generated by TV–
Prox–GNWE converges to the consensus subspace, this is
shown in Fig. 1, by means of the Laplacian matrix L of the
multiplier graph. The initial strategy profile x(0) is randomly
chosen in Ω. As expected from the result in Theorem 1, the
constraints are satisfied asymptotically, see Fig. 2.
Fig. 1: Convergence of the strategy profile x(k) to the
consensus subspace. The matrix L is the Laplacian matrix
associated to the multiplier graph.
Fig. 2: Asymptotic satisfaction of the time-varying affine
coupling constraints Cx(k) ≤ c(k).
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In multi-agent network games, subject to time-varying
coupling constraints and time-varying communication net-
work, described by strongly connected digraphs, agents can
fail to converge when they adopt proximal dynamics. Nev-
ertheless, it is developed an iterative equilibrium seeking al-
gorithms (TV–Prox–GNWE) that ensures the global conver-
gence of the agents’ strategies to an normalized equilibrium
of the game, when it exists.
One of the most important open question in these type
of problems regards the existence of an equilibrium point.
This work can be improved with a new assumption for the
equilibrium existence, which is general and easy to check.
APPENDIX
A. Algorithm derivation
In this section, we propose the complete derivation of
the iterative algorithm that we called TV–Prox–GNWE. We
divide the derivation in two mains steps
1) Equilibria reformulation
2) Modified proximal point algorithm
1) Equilibria reformulation: the set of pn-ENWE, defined
by the two equalities in (8), can be equivalently rephrased
as the set of fixed points of a suitable mappings. First, we
introduce the block-diagonal proximal operator
proxf




z1
...
zN



 :=


proxf¯1(z1)
...
proxf¯N (zN )

 . (11)
In (8), the first equality is equivalent to
x = ∩k>k¯ proxf (A(k)x−Λ(k)C
⊤(k)σ) ,
where A(k) := A(k)⊗ In and Λ(k) = diag((αi(k))i∈N )⊗
In. The second equality holds true if and only if σ =
proj
RM
(σ +C(k)x− c(k)).
In order to describe via operators these two relations, we
define the static mappings
R := diag(proxf , projRM
≥0
) (12)
and the time-varying affine one Gk : R
nN+M → RnN+M as
Gk(·) := G ·+
[
0
c(k)
]
:=
[
A(k) −Λ(k)C⊤(k)
C(k) I
]
· −
[
0
c(k)
]
.
(13)
As a result, the dynamics of the game result equal to[
x(k + 1)
σ(k + 1)
]
= R ◦ Gk
([
x(k)
σ(k)
])
. (14)
We exploit this new compact form to describe the set of
pn–ENWE via the fixed points of R ◦ Gk. In particular, by
Definiton 3, a pair (x¯, σ¯) is a pn–ENWE of the game in (4)
if and only if col((x¯, σ¯)) ∈ ∩k>k¯fix(R ◦ Gk). Furthermore,
from Lemma 1, we also know that a pn–ENWE is a p–
GNWE of the original game. So, we focus on the design of
an algorithm converging to the subset E for which we can
take advantage of this new formulation.
A useful tool to solve fixed point seeking problem is to
reformulate it as a zero finding problem, as done in the next
lemma, see [28, Ch. 26].
Lemma 2 ([28, Prop. 26.1 (iv)]): Let B := F × NRM
≥0
,
with F :=
∏N
i=1 ∂f¯i. Then,
fix (R ◦ Gk) = zer (Ak) ,
where Ak := B + Id− Gk.
2) Modified proximal point algorithm: we describe in
details the passages to develop the iterative algorithm solving
the zero finding problem associated to the operator Ak,
and, as a consequence, the original one of finding pn–
ENWE of (4). We adopt a modified version of the prox-
imal point algorithm (PPP) (see [28, Prop. 23.39] for its
standard formulation). In particular, the update rule is a
preconditioned version of the PPP algorithm proposed in
[29, Eq. 4.18], after defining ̟ := col(x(k), σ(k)) and
̟+ := col(x(k + 1), σ(k + 1)), it can be rewritten as
˜̟ = JΦ−1(k)Ak̟ (15a)
̟+ =̟ + γ(k)Q¯(k)Φ(k)( ˜̟ −̟) (15b)
where and γ(k) > 0 is the step–size of the algorithm
and Q¯(k) := diag(Q(k), I). The preconditioning matrix is
chosen as
Φ(k) :=
[
δ−1(k) +A(k) −Λ(k)C(k)⊤
C(k) β(k)IM
]
(16)
where β(k) ∈ R>0 and δ(k) := diag((δi(k))i∈N )⊗ In. The
self-adjoint and skew symmetric components are defined as
U(k) := (Φ(k)+Φ⊤(k))/2 and S(k) := (Φ(k)−Φ⊤(k))/2.
Due to the non symmetric preconditioning the resolvent
operator takes the form
JΦ−1(k)Ak := JU−1(k)(Ak+S(k))(Id+ U
−1(k)S(k)) .
The parameters δ(k) and β(k) in the preconditioning have
to be chosen such that U(k) ≻ 0 and ‖Q¯(k)U(k)‖ ≤
γ−1(k). This can be done via the Gerschgorin Circle
Theorem for partitioned matrices (more stringent but more
involved bounds can be obtained via [30, Th. 2.1]). The
resulting bounds are reported in (10).
Using a reasoning akin to the one in [29, Proof of Th. 4.2],
one can show that, at every time instant k, the set of fixed
points of the mapping describing the update in (15a)–(15b)
coincides with zer(Ak).
Finally, we are ready for the complete derivation of the
algorithm by explicitly compute the local update rules of
the agents and of the central coordinator. We omit the time
dependency in the following formulas.
First, we focus on (15a) , so
˜̟ = JU−1(A+S)(Id+ U
−1S)̟ (17a)
˜̟ + U−1(A+ S) ˜̟ ∋̟ + U−1S̟ (17b)
0 ∈ U( ˜̟ −̟) +A ˜̟ + S( ˜̟ −̟) (17c)
0 ∈ Φ( ˜̟ −̟) +A ˜̟ (17d)
By solving the first row block of (17d), i.e. 0 ∈ (δ−1 +
A)(x˜−x)−ΛC⊤(σ˜−σ)+F (x˜)+ x˜−Ax˜+ΛC⊤σ˜ , we
obtain
0nN ∈ δ
−1(x˜− x)−Ax+ΛC⊤σ + F (x˜) + x˜
0nN ∈ (δ
−1 + I)x˜+ F (x˜)− δ−1x−Ax+ΛC⊤σ .
Let us define, with a small abuse of notation, the matrix
1
δ−1+1
:= diag
((
1
δ
−1
i
+1
)
i∈N
)
⊗ In, then we attain
0nN ∈ x˜+
1
δ−1+1
F (x˜) + 1
δ−1+1
[
ΛC⊤σ − δ−1x−Ax
]
x˜ = J 1
δ−1+1
F
(
1
δ−1+1
[
δ−1x+Ax−ΛC⊤σ
])
. (18)
The second row block instead reads as 0 ∈ C(x˜ − x) +
β(σ˜ − σ) +NRM
≥0
(σ˜) + σ˜ − Cx˜+ c, and leads to
0M ∈ −Cx+ β(σ˜ − σ) +NRM
≥0
(σ˜) + c (19a)
σ˜ = JN
RM
≥0
(
σ + 1β (Cx− c)
)
(19b)
Combining (18) and (19b) together with (15b), leads to
the final formulation for the TV–Prox–GNWE, its dynamics
are shown in (9a) – (9d).
B. Convergence proof of TV–Prox–GNWE
In order to simplify the proofs proposed in the following,
let us introduce some useful definition that will be adopted
thorough the whole section. We define the two scalars Lk
and mk, the former is the Lipschitz constant of S(k) and the
latter is such that mk‖x‖2 < 〈U(k)x, x〉, this also implies
that ‖U−1(k)‖ ≤ m−1k . Next, we define the time-varying
matrixK(k) := QkU(k) and the scalars ρ := m
−1
k Lk, qm :=
mini[Qk]ii and Mk ≥ ‖U(k)‖. Notice that, without loss
of generality, we can always choose the normalized version
of the left Perron Frobenius eigenvector q(k) of the matrix
A(k), so maxi[Qk]ii ≤ 1.
In the following, we also omit the time dependency of the
operators when this does not lead to ambiguities. The proofs
follow similar steps to the ones in [29, Prop.2.1 and 4.2],
where the case of a static communication network is consid-
ered.
Lemma 3: For all k ∈ N, consider the time-varying
operator
TΦ := JΦ−1A + U
−1S(JΦ−1A − Id) , (20)
then the following hold:
(i) TΦis quasi-nonexpansive in the space HK ,
(ii) if Lk ≤ mk, then fix(TΦ) = zer(A) .
Proof: (i) From the proof of [19, Th. 5], the operator
A := B + Id − Gk is maximally monotone in HQ for all
k ∈ N. The operator S is also maximally monotone, since
it is a skew-symmetric matrix, [28, Ex. 20.30]. Next, we
define the two auxiliary operators M = U−1(A + S) and
D = −U−1S. It is easy to see that A is monotone and D is
monotone and ρ-Lipschitz, , inHK . From [29, Prop. 2.1 (3)],
we obtain that for ̟∗ ∈ fix(TΦ) it holds for some γ¯ > 0
‖TΦ̟ −̟
∗‖2K ≤ ‖̟ −̟
∗‖K − (1 + ρ
2)‖̟ − x‖2K (21)
where x := JM(̟ − D̟). Hence, we conclude that TΦ is
quasi-nonexpansive in HK .
(ii) If Lk ≤ mk, then the result follows directly from [29,
Prop. 2.1 (1)], where we considered A := M, B1 = 0 and
B2 := D.
Proof of Theorem 1
Consider TΦ, as in (20), then the following relation always
holds
QU(Id− TΦ)(x) = QΦ(x− JΦ−1A) . (22)
From Lemma 3 we know that TΦ is quasi-nonexpansive in
HK , hence S := (Id+ TΦ)/2 belongs to the class I in HK ,
[21, Prop. 2.2(v)]. From [29, Prop. 4.1] and (22), we define
the operator
WΦ := Id− ‖K‖
−1K(Id− S)
= Id−
1
2
‖K‖−1K(Id− TΦ) ,
(23)
belonging to I in H and fix(WΦ) = fix(TΦ) = zer(A),
where the last equality comes from Lemma 3. The update
rule in (15) can be rewritten as
̟+ =̟ + 2γ‖K‖(WΦ̟ −̟) , (24)
where γ‖K‖ < 1 for all k, due to the choice of δi and β.
Thus, from [21, Th. 4.2(ii) and 4.3], we have that (‖̟ −
WΦ̟‖2)k∈N is summable and converges in H to an element
̟ ∈ Ec, hence to a pn-ENWE, if and only if every sequential
cluster point of sequence belong to Ec.
Toward this aim, we define x̟ := JΦ−1A(̟) then we
prove that̟−x̟ → 0 and x̟ → x̟ ∈ zer(A), concluding
the proof.
First, notice that, due to the choice of the coefficients δ
and β in Φ(k), it holds
‖̟ − TΦ̟‖
2
K ≤ ‖K
−1‖‖̟ − TΦ̟‖
2
≤ 4m−1k M
2
k‖̟ −WΦ̟‖
2 → 0 .
(25)
Let us define x̟ := Jγ¯A(̟ − γ¯U−1S̟), Moreover, from
(21), it follows
(1− ρ2)‖̟ − x̟‖K ≤ ‖̟ −̟
∗‖K − ‖TΦ̟ −̟‖K
= −‖TΦ̟ −̟‖K − 2〈TΦ̟ −̟,̟ −̟
∗〉K
≤ −‖TΦ̟ −̟‖K − 2Mk‖TΦ̟ −̟‖K‖̟ −̟
∗‖
The above inequality leads to
(1− ρ2)mkqm‖̟ − x̟‖ ≤ −‖TΦ̟ −̟‖K (26)
− 2Mk‖TΦ̟ −̟‖K‖̟ −̟
∗‖
The sequence (‖̟(k)−̟∗‖)k∈N is bounded and from (25)
and (26), we deduce that ̟ − x̟ → 0. Notice also that
‖QΦ(̟ − x̟)‖ ≤ (Mk + L)‖̟− x̟‖ → 0 .
From the definition of x̟ , it follows
uk := QΦ(̟ − x̟) ∈Axω .
Thus, since uk → 0, we conclude that x̟ → x̟ ∈ zer(A).
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